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1 Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) refers to interrelated connected 
network of smart devices, sensors, embedded computers 
and etc. that store,process and communicate heterogeneous 
data. IoT and its applications propagate to majority of life’s 
infrastructure ranging from health and food production to 
smart cities and urban management. While efficiency and 
prevalence of IoT are increasing, security issues remain a 
necessary concern for industries (Tankard 2015). Internet-
connected devices, including those deployed in an IoT archi-
tecture, are increasingly targeted by cybercriminals due to 
their pervasiveness and the ability to use the compromised 
devices to further attack the underlying architecture (Choo 
2014; Pajouh et al. 2016; D’Orazio et al. 2017; Fortino and 
Trunfio 2014; Watson and Dehghantanha 2016). In the case 
of ransomware, for example, devices that are capable of 
storing a reasonably amount of data (e.g., Android and iOS 
devices) are likely to be targeted (Damshenas et al. 2015; 
D’Orazio and Choo 2016; Gubbi et al. 2013). Thus, ensuring 
the security of IoT nodes against threats such as malware is 
a topic of ongoing interest (Bertino et al. 2016; Sicari et al. 
2015; Kumar and Patel 2014; Abomhara and Kien 2015; 
Daryabar et al. 2012; Teing et al. 2017; Dezfouli et al. 2016).
While malware detection and mitigation research is now 
new, ransomware detection and mitigation remains chal-
lenging. Ransomware is a relatively new malware type that 
attempts to encrypt a compromised device’s data using a 
strong encryption algorithm (O’Gorman and McDonald 
2012). The victim will then have to pay the ransom (usually 
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using bitcoins) in order to obtain the password or decryption 
key (Song et al. 2016). Consequences include temporary or 
permanent loss of sensitive information, disruption of regu-
lar operations, direct/indirect financial losses (e.g., to restore 
systems and restore an organizations reputation) (FBI 2016).
A popular malware detection approach is the use of 
machine learning techniques to identify patterns of spe-
cific feature(s) within a malware code or behavior to dis-
tinguish malware from non-malicious applications (Faruki 
et al. 2015; Damshenas et al. 2015; Pajouh et al. 2016). For 
example, Andronio et al. (2015) proposed an Android ran-
somware detection system, Heldroid, that is based on Natu-
ral Language Processing (NLP). The approaches identify 
ransomware based on their typical characteristics, such as 
call function and application manifests. EldeRan (Sgandurra 
et al. 2016) is another machine learning based model for 
dynamically analyzing and classifying ransomware based on 
their installation activities. Mercaldo et al. (2016) presented 
a parser that analyzes a sample code and automatically iden-
tifies ransomware related instructions. In Caviglione et al. 
(2016), malware covert communications are detected using 
neural networks and decision tree techniques.
Changes in the energy consumption of a typical infected 
device can also be used as a feature for malware detection 
(Caviglione et al. 2016), as it could be trivial for a malware 
developer to change malware function calls or its behav-
iour but changing its power usage pattern is less likely and 
more difficult to realise (Shaerpour et al. 2013). Addition-
ally, power usage pattern is relatively similar on different 
platforms; thus, power consumption based detection meth-
ods appear to be a viable approach (Potlapally et al. 2006). 
Kim et al. (2008) proposed a power-aware malware detection 
framework based on anomalies in a device energy consump-
tion pattern. Similarly, Merlo et al. (2015) demonstrated the 
potential of detecting a malware on an Android device based 
on its energy consumption.
In this paper, we use machine learning techniques to 
detect ransomware based on their power usage patterns on 
IoT nodes, and specifically Android devices. The proposed 
model grinds device’s power usage into subsamples, clas-
sifies them and aggregates outputs to increase the detection 
rate to 95.65%.
2  Related literature
Securing IoT nodes is an active research area. For example, 
Sicari et al. (2015) and Jing et al. (2014) discussed several 
key research challenges and identified potential solutions 
and research opportunities for IoT security, and Abomhara 
and Kien (2015) provided a categorisation of IoT related 
threats.
Malware detection and mitigation for IoT nodes is one 
of several research challenges and opportunities identi-
fied, and is an ongoing research topic (Faruki et al. 2015; 
Suarez-Tangil et al. 2014). Detection methods include 
those based on malware’s properties (e.g., application 
signatures), and tracking of malicious activity and their 
energy consumption (Shaerpour et al. 2013). Malware 
detection based on energy consumption footprint is known 
to be more robust against malware anti-forensic techniques 
as changing a malware power consumption pattern is much 
more challenging in practice, compared to changing its 
function calls or application codes (Damshenas et  al. 
2013).
Kim et al. (2008) proposed a power-aware malware 
detection framework that detects previously unknown 
battery-draining malware. Their framework comprises a 
power monitoring tool and a data analyzer which gener-
ates a power signature to identify a malware. Merlo et al. 
(2015) presented an energy-related measurement at a dif-
ferent levels of abstraction for Android devices in order to 
achieve a trade-off between measurement precision and 
effective energy based profiling of malware. Yang and 
Tang (2016) used the frequencies of energy consumption 
waveform to generate a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) 
based on Mel frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCC) 
to detect malicious software. In Yang and Tang (2016), 
authors use a complex statistical approach to make deci-
sion based on power usage. This, however, is generally 
too computationally expensive for IoT nodes. The authors 
also employed frequencies of waveform in their approach; 
therefore, changes in the CPU’s specification would have 
a substantial impact on the results even though the wave-
form’s visual form remains invariant.
Machine learning algorithm, as previously discussed, 
has been widely employed in cyber security research, 
including malware detection. Andronio et al. (2015) pre-
sented Heldroid to detect Android ransomware Heldroid 
based on file encryption activities using a NLP-based text 
classifier, locking detector and a tracker. Heldroid utilises 
extracted features from malware application such as alert 
messages, function call and etc. Sgandurra et al. (2016) 
proposed EldeRan for dynamically analysing and classi-
fying ransomware based on the set of actions performed 
by the applications in their installation phase. EldeRan is 
designed for Windows platform and the most relevant fea-
ture to the class label is Registry Keys Operations, which 
is not applicable for Android devices. Mercaldo et  al. 
(2016) presented a three-step process to detect Android 
ransomware family. Similar to other static malware detec-
tion approaches, techniques such as code metamorphism 
could be used to evade detection.
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3  Research methodology
To develop a fingerprint of ransomware’s energy consump-
tion, initially, we need to record the power usage of tar-
geted applications. Similar to the approaches in previous 
studies (Yang 2012; Merlo et al. 2015) we used Power-
Tutor to monitor and sample power usage of all running 
processes in 500 ms intervals. PowerTutor creates logfiles 
containing sequence of energy usage of each process at 
given sampling interval. We conducted our experiments on 
three different Android devices, namely: a Samsung Gal-
axy SIII (CPU: 1.4 GHz, RAM: 2GB, OS: Android 4.4), a 
Samsung Galaxy S Duos (CPU: 1.0 GHz, RAM: 768 MB, 
OS: Android 4.0.1), and an Asus Padfone Infinity (CPU: 
1.7 GHz, RAM: 2 GB, OS: Android 4.4). To collect energy 
consumption logs of both ransomware and goodware, we 
installed the most popular Android applications, namely: 
Gmail (version 9.6.83), Facebook (version 99.0.0.26.69), 
Google Chrome (version 53.0.2785.124), Youtube (version 
11.39.56), Whatsapp (version 2.16.306), Skype (version 
7.20.0.411), AngryBrids (version 6.1.5), Google Maps 
(version 9.39.2), Music Player (version 4.2.52), Twitter 
(version 6.19.0), Instagram (version 9.6.0) and Guardian 
(version 3.13.107) and six active and recent ransomware 
samples (see Table 1) on all devices. All ransomware 
were downloaded via VirusTotal1 Intelligence API, and 
these ransomware have active Command and Control (C2) 
servers.
We then use PowerTutor to monitor and record the 
device processes’ power usage (while running the appli-
cations and ransomware, separately) for 5 min. While run-
ning the applications (also referred to as goodware), the 
user interactions mirrored a real world usage. This proce-
dure was repeated five times per device; thus, we obtained 
5repeation × 3device = 15 power usage samples for each and 
every application and ransomware.
As each device’s CPU has its own power usage specifi-
cation, the energy consumption of all devices were mapped 
to a specific range in order to have a meaningful evalua-
tion. So, we normalised the CPU power consumption for 
all monitored processes on the devices to [0, 1], where 0 
indicates no power usage and 1 presents the maximum 
CPU power utilisation. Scripts were written to process log-
files, extract and normalize power usage values, and gener-
ate a row-normalized dataset. Each row includes a label 
(i.e., goodware or ransomware) and a normalized sequence 
of energy consumption for five minutes of activity.
3.1  Classification
Assigning correct label to a sample based on previous 
observations is a key element of Supervised Learning and 
Classification (Michalski et al. 2013). We applied four state-
of-the-art classifiers, namely: k-Nearest Neighbor (KNN), 
Neural Network (NN), Support Vector Machine (SVM) and 
Random Forest (RF), on the power usage samples to recog-
nise the class of each sequence of power consumption. KNN 
is a simple and powerful classifier which seeks K nearest 
sample(s) and assigns the majority of neighbor’s label to the 
given samples (Cover and Hart 1967). NN (Haykin 1998) 
is an implementation of human brain networks and mostly 
used to approximate the function between inputs and output. 
Another popular technique for supervised learning is SVM 
(Burges 1998), which is based on the concept of decision 
planes that define decision boundaries. A decision plane dif-
ferentiates a set of objects based on their class memberships. 
Ensemble learning has been the motivation of developing 
RF (Verikas et al. 2011) that operates by constructing a mul-
titude of decision trees at training time and generating the 
class label.
Power usage sequence of each process can be consid-
ered as time-series data. A wide range of methods have been 
proposed to classify time-series data (Xing et al. 2010; Fu 
2011). In this study, a distance based time-series classifi-
cation approach based on Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) 
(Müller 2007) is used for distance measure, and KNN is used 
as a classifier. Similarity distance is a key element in KNN 
classification and we apply two different distances to find the 
closest neighbor as follows:
• Euclidean distance: Euclidean distance or Euclidean 
metric is the intuitive distance between two vectors in 
Euclidean space and calculated as follow: 
• Dynamic time warping (DTW): DTW is a recognized 
technique for finding an optimal alignment between two 
time-dependent sequences (see Fig. 1). According to 
DTW’s ability to deal with time deformations and issues 
associated with speed differences in time-dependent 
(1)d(x, y) =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
(xi − yi)
2.
Table 1  Ransomware
MD5 hash Download date
30a03d7a5e6ec234bbb6d333e9f30ec9 14 Oct 2016
597bbb81e6409a389299aa8ded222e8b 5 Oct 2016
6315c783974743327f8d19c67c465f28 13 Oct 2016
37cd3ac4d5acda83a5512032c99ea279 12 Oct 2016
e1b9eb7415892ef6ca3fda9f304428a6 12 Oct 2016
902c4044dc7872382001e2e3e36a8c0f 11 Oct 2016
1 http://www.virustotal.com.
 A. Azmoodeh et al.
1 3
data, it is also employed to calculate distance or simi-
larity between time series (Müller 2007). Let us denote 
two sequences that display two discrete subsamples as 
X = (x1,… , xn) and Y = (y1,… , ym) of length m, n 휖 ℕ. 
DTW uses a Cost Matrix C휖ℝn×m. Each cell Ci,j indi-
cates the distance between xi and yj (see Fig. 2). DTW’s 
purpose is to discover an optimal alignment between X 
and Y having a minimal entirely distance. As an intui-
tive explanation, an optimal alignment traverse across 
a valley of low cost cells within the cost matrix C. A 
warping path is specified as a sequence p = {p1,… , pL} 
with pl = (nl,ml)휖[1:N] × [1:M], l휖[1:L] satisfying the 
following conditions:
– Boundary condition: p1 = (1, 1) and pL = (N,M).
– Monotonicity condition: n1 ≤ n2 ≤ ⋯ ≤ nL and
m1 ≤ m2 ≤⋯ ≤ mL.
– Step size condition: pl+1 − pl = {(1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)}
for l휖[1:L1].
The summation of all local distances of a warping path’s 
elements outcomes the total cost of path and in order to find 
optimal warping path p∗, the path having minimum total 
cost among all possible paths is selected. Finally, to meas-
ure similarity or distance between two sequences X and Y, 
their total cost of optimal warping path are evaluated. The 
total cost cp(X, Y) of a warping path p between X and Y with 
respect to the local cost measure c is defined as: 
(2)cp(X, Y) =
L∑
l=1
c(xnl, yml).
The DTW distance DTW(X, Y) between X and Y is then 
defined as the total cost of p∗: 
Figure 3 illustrates how DTW aligns two power usage 
subsamples in order to find optimal path between them for 
distance calculation.
3.2  Metrics and cross‑validation
Similar to the approach in (Buczak and Guven 2016), we 
use the following four common performance indicators for 
malware detection:
• True positive (TP): indicates that a ransomware is cor-
rectly predicted as a malicious application.
• True negative (TN): indicates that a goodware is detected 
as a non-malicious application correctly.
• False positive (FP): indicates that a goodware is mistak-
enly detected as a malicious application.
• False negative (FN): indicates that a ransomware is not 
detected and labelled as a non-malicious application.
To evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed method, we 
used machine learning performance evaluation metrics that 
are commonly used in the literature, namely: Accuracy, 
Recall, Precision and F-Measure.
Accuracy is the number of samples that a classifier cor-
rectly detects, divided by the number of all ransomware and 
goodware applications:
(3)
DTW(X,Y) = cp∗(X,Y) = min{cp(X,Y)| p is an (N,M)
− warping path}.
(4)Accuracy = TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
.
Fig. 1  Alignment between two different sequences
Fig. 2  Dynamic Time Warping’s path finding
Fig. 3  Dynamic time Warping’s path finding example for power 
usage sequences
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Precision is the ratio of predicted ransomware that are cor-
rectly labelled a malware. Thus, Precision is defined as 
follows:
Recall or detection rate is the ratio of ransomware samples 
that are correctly predicted, and is defined as follows:
(5)Precision = TP
TP + FP
.
(6)Recall = TP
TP + FN
.
F-Measure is the harmonic mean of precision and recall, and 
is defined as follows:
Cross-validation (Kohavi et  al. 1995) is a fundamental 
technique in machine learning to assess the extent that the 
findings of an experiment can be generalized into an inde-
pendent dataset. In order to evaluate the performance of the 
proposed method, we used the leave-one-out cross valida-
tion. We are aware that in order to implement this validation 
method, all subsamples of a sample need to be excluded 
(7)F −Measure = 2 ∗ TP
2 ∗ TP + FP + FN
.
Fig. 4  Power consumption 
graph for Simplocker ransom-
ware
Fig. 5  Power consumption 
graph for facebook application
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from the classifier training phase. All evaluations were con-
ducted using MATLAB R2015a running on a Microsoft 
Windows 10 Pro personal computer powered by Intel Core 
i7 2.67 GHz and 8 GB RAM.
We will evaluate the performance of the classification 
algorithms in the next section.
4  Performance of classification algorithms
Table 2 displays the findings of applying classification algo-
rithms on our dataset. As previously discussed, we will now 
use the leave-one-out technique for cross validation. Fig-
ures 4 and 5 illustrate the power usage graph of Simplocker 
ransomware and Facebook application, respectively. 
Comparison of Figs. 5 and 4 reflects a significant differ-
ence between patterns of power consumption of ransomware 
versus benign applications. However, as patterns of power 
consumptions are not predictable and depend on many fac-
tors such as files content, encryption algorithm etc. samples 
are highly distributed in the feature space.
It appears that direct application of conventional clas-
sification algorithms namely NN, KNN and SVM, is not 
promising. For example, the KNN classifier that uses DTW 
as a similarity measure outperformed other techniques while 
conventional KNN (with parameter setting of K = 1, 5, 10) 
is ranked lowest among the classification approaches.
Since Euclidean method calculates similarity by sum-
ming distances between corresponding points of samples, 
the calculated distance could be far when the position of 
occurring power usage patterns varies (even if samples are 
visually cognate). On the other hand, DTW attempts to align 
samples based on the distance between pieces of samples 
that are more similar regardless of the position of similar 
energy usage pattern. Consequently, the performance of 
KNN classifier is significantly influenced by the distance 
criteria. The second place belongs to RF that selects subset 
of features and works in splitted feature spaces instead of 
using a complete feature space. These observations led us to 
hypothesis that a subset of features (i.e., a specific interval 
within Ransomware infection period) may improve perfor-
mance of classification techniques.
5  Proposed method
In the proposed method to overcome high distribution of 
features, power usage samples are divided into subsamples 
prior to using different classification techniques to identify 
the subsamples’ labels.
To divide the power usage samples, we assume a fix 
window size (interval) and move it forward from the start-
ing point of each sample (when the process has actually 
started), while we append a new subsample to a set of 
subsamples in each step as depicted in Fig. 6. Algorithm 1 
describes the algorithm we used to receive a set of sam-
ples and a window size w and generate the subsample’s 
database. Subsample (window) size is a time-value. For 
example, w = 6 means that the subsample contains values 
for 6 intervals of PowerTutor; therefore, its time-length is 
6 × 500ms = 3000ms.
Input: Sample set S = {Sample1, Sample2, . . . , Samplen}
& window size w
Output: Subsamples set DB
DB ← {}
for i← 1 to n do
l ← 1
while (l + w) < length(samplei) do
Append 〈Labeli, Pl, ., Pl+w〉 to DB
l ← l + 1
end
end
return DB
A label should be assigned to each and every subsample 
to determine the sample class. As shown in Algorithm 2, 
a classifier is trained using the subsample database DB. 
The sample is then splitted into a set of subsamples and 
the Sample Grinding algorithm (1) is used to identify each 
subsample’s label by the trained classifier. This approach 
identifies the samples class based on the pattern of most 
similar item in the subsample’s database and sets its final 
label by aggregating all subsamples’ labels. Figure 7 illus-
trates the training phase, and Fig. 8 depicts classification 
phase of the proposed method.
Table 2  Performance of 
machine learning techniques: a 
comparative summary
Best (optimal) values are highlighted in bold
Accuracy (%) Recall (%) Precision (%) F-Measure (%)
KNN (K = 1) 71.85 71.11 56.14 62.75
KNN (K = 5) 72.59 72.22 57.02 63.73
KNN (K = 10) 72.22 71.11 56.64 63.05
KNN (K = 1 and DTW) 83.70 78.89 73.96 76.34
Neural network 75.93 73.33 61.68 67.01
Random forest 80.74 76.67 69.00 72.63
SVM 78.52 74.44 65.69 69.79
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Fig. 6  Subsampling against a 
sample
Fig. 7  Training phase of the 
proposed method
Fig. 8  Classification phase of 
the proposed method
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Input: Subsample database DB&Sample
Output: Label{R,G}
Labels← {}
Classifier = TrainClassifier(DB)
Subsamples = Grind Sample Using Algorithm 1
i← 1
while i < size(Subsamples) do
L← Classifier(Subsamplei)
Append L to Labels
i← i+ 1
end
return most frequent item in Labels
In the next section, we will discuss our findings.
6  Findings and discussion
We experimented with different window sizes, ranging from 
5 to 50 each an increment of 5 in each experiment. Hence, 
the window size of each dataset includes subsamples with 
length w.
As discussed in Sect. 5, all subsamples of each sample 
should be classified. We evaluated grinded data using SVM 
(see Table 5; Fig. 11), NN (see Table 6; Fig. 12), RF (see 
Table 7; Fig. 13) and KNN with K = 1 classifiers. Table 3 
and Fig. 9 show the result for KNN employing the Euclid-
ean distance. Similar setting was applied for KNN using 
DTW distance and the findings are presented in Table 4 and 
Fig. 10. In order to summarise the findings and since K = 1 
is the setting with higher efficiency, other settings (K = 5, 10
) for KNN are excluded.
As shown in Fig. 14, the KNN classifier that uses DTW 
distance with a subsample size of 7.5 s outperformed all 
other methods in terms of detection rate 95.65% and perfor-
mance of 94.27%. Although KNN is the least sophisticated 
classification approach, it outperformed other rival classifi-
cation techniques since it only relies on the formation and 
distribution of goodware’s and ransomware’s subsamples. 
The performance of KNN using DTW for all evaluation met-
rics peaks at window size = 15. However, the remaining clas-
sifiers were not able to achieve an optimal performance at 
the specified window size. For example, NN’s best accuracy, 
precision and F-measure occurred at w = 20, while highest 
recall was achieved at w = 15. The numerical results indi-
cate that subsamples are not from specified and exact data 
Table 3  Evaluation metrics for different window sizes, KNN and 
Euclidean distance: a comparative summary
Best (optimal) values are highlighted in bold
Window size Accuracy 
(%)
Recall (%) Precision 
(%)
F-Measure 
(%)
5 90.67 89.86 84.93 87.32
10 92.75 94.29 86.84 90.41
15 92.23 92.86 86.67 89.66
20 91.19 90.00 86.30 88.11
25 86.53 90.00 76.83 82.89
30 87.05 91.43 77.11 83.66
35 86.01 91.43 75.29 82.58
40 81.87 94.29 68.04 79.04
45 78.24 91.43 64.00 75.29
50 78.24 91.43 64.00 75.29
Fig. 9  Evaluation Metrics for different Window Sizes, KNN and 
Euclidean distance: A Comparative Summary
Table 4  Evaluation metrics for different window sizes, KNN and 
DTW distance: a comparative summary
Best (optimal) values are highlighted in bold
Window size Accuracy 
(%)
Recall (%) Precision 
(%)
F-Measure 
(%)
5 89.64 86.96 84.51 85.71
10 91.19 92.75 84.21 88.28
15 94.27 95.65 89.19 92.31
20 91.19 94.20 83.33 88.44
25 91.19 94.20 83.33 88.44
30 92.23 92.75 86.49 89.51
35 91.19 91.30 85.14 88.11
40 90.67 89.86 84.93 87.32
45 89.64 86.96 84.51 85.71
50 89.11 84.28 85.51 84.89
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distribution and classes have overlap sample(s) in feature 
space. Therefore, KNN that seeks for most similar subsam-
ple to input data outperform other classification approaches. 
Moreover, according to ability to align subsamples, DTW 
can find closer energy consumption pattern and consequently 
provide more accurate classification results than euclidean.
Furthermore and in practice, KNN’s requirement for con-
current distance calculations between training and testing 
objects can be implemented using parallel processing (so 
distances can be independently computed). Subsamples dic-
tionary can be partitioned into sperate IoT nodes and each 
subsample is sent to nodes. They return a label and a similar-
ity value and the label having less similarity value is final 
subsample’s label. This approach reduces the classification 
time and mitigates the need for storage capacity in every 
node.
7  Conclusion
With increasing prevalence of Internet-connected devices 
and things in our data-centric society, ensuring the secu-
rity of IoT networks is vital. Successfully compromised IoT 
nodes could hold the network to ransom (D’Orazio et al. 
2017; Choo 2014). For example, in the case of ransom-
ware, denying availability to data in an IoT network could 
Fig. 10  Evaluation metrics for different window sizes, KNN and 
DTW distance: a comparative summary
Table 5  Evaluation metrics for different window sizes and SVM: a 
comparative summary
Best (optimal) values are highlighted in bold
Window size Accuracy 
(%)
Recall (%) Precision 
(%)
F-Measure 
(%)
5 77.72 59.42 73.21 65.60
10 88.60 85.51 83.10 84.29
15 91.19 94.20 83.33 88.44
20 89.64 82.61 87.69 85.07
25 87.56 75.36 88.14 81.25
30 81.35 55.07 88.37 67.86
35 78.24 47.83 84.62 61.11
40 78.24 47.83 84.62 61.11
45 76.17 42.03 82.86 55.77
50 76.68 42.03 85.29 56.31
Fig. 11  Evaluation metrics for different window sizes and SVM: a 
comparative summary
Table 6  Evaluation metrics for different window sizes and neural 
network: a comparative summary
Best (optimal) values are highlighted in bold
Window size Accuracy 
(%)
Recall (%) Precision 
(%)
F-Measure 
(%)
5 88.08 82.61 83.82 83.21
10 88.08 84.06 82.86 83.45
15 89.64 88.41 83.56 85.92
20 90.67 86.96 86.96 86.96
25 89.64 85.51 85.51 85.51
30 89.12 85.51 84.29 84.89
35 88.08 82.61 83.82 83.21
40 86.01 81.16 80.00 80.58
45 85.49 82.61 78.08 80.28
50 86.01 82.61% 79.17 80.85
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adversely affect the operation of an organisation and result 
in significant financial loss and reputation damage.
In this paper, we presented an approach to detect ran-
somware, using their power consumption. Specifically, we 
utilise the unique local fingerprint of ransomware’s energy 
consumption to distinguish ransomware from non-malicious 
applications. The sequence of applications’ energy con-
sumption is splitted into several sequences of power usage 
subsamples, which are then classified to build aggregated 
subsample’s class labels. Our set of experiments demon-
strated that our approach achieved a detection rate of 95.65% 
and a precision rate of 89.19%.
Future works include prototyping the proposed approach 
for deploying in a real-world IoT network, with the aims of 
evaluation and refinement.
Fig. 12  Evaluation metrics for different window sizes and neural net-
work: a comparative summary
Table 7  Evaluation metrics for different window sizes and random 
forest: a comparative summary
Best (optimal) values are highlighted in bold
Window size Accuracy 
(%)
Recall (%) Precision 
(%)
F-Measure 
(%)
5 86.01 69.57 88.89 78.05
10 87.05 74.29 88.14 80.62
15 87.05 77.14 85.71 81.20
20 84.97 75.71 81.54 78.52
25 86.01 75.71 84.13 79.70
30 85.49 75.71 82.81 79.10
35 85.49 74.29 83.87 78.79
40  87.56 78.57 85.94 82.09
45 86.01 78.57 82.09 80.29
50 86.01 75.71 84.13 79.70
Fig. 13  Evaluation metrics for different window sizes and random 
forest: a comparative summary
Fig. 14  Best results of each 
classifier in each measurement: 
a comparative summary
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